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Besides its function to maintain the social and economic well-being of a nation, 
operating critical infrastructure serves as a proof of the ability of the state to 
provide protection to its citizens. Hence, a successful terrorist attack targeting 
critical infrastructure - in addition to generating fear and panic in the ranks 
of society undermines the operational character of the state. In recent years, 
several terrorist incidents in Europe have highlighted the vulnerability of crit-
ical infrastructure and, consequently, the importance of protecting it. Bearing 
this in mind, the protection of critical infrastructure has become a high prior-
ity for Western states, in parallel with the growing trend of risks, challenges 
and threats posed by international terrorism. Recently Europe has seen an in-
crease in terrorist attacks against members of law enforcement as well as the 
armed forces. This paper argues that such attacks should also be considered 
as attacks on critical infrastructure, as it is ultimately the human resources be-
ing responsible for the well-functioning of those agencies. Further, the paper 
aims to examine the religious justification of Jihadist terrorist attacks against 
critical infrastructure. 
Keywords: Critical infrastructure, terrorist attack, Salafi-Jihadism, al-Qā‛ida, 
Islamic State
Introduction
Greatly simplified, critical infrastructure can be defined as all those infrastruc-
tures our society depends on in daily life, including transport, energy, informa-
tion technology and many other sectors. Critical infrastructure has made life 
of the citizens in a modern state much more simple compared to previous dec-
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ades, but it has also made them dependent of and vulnerable to these complex 
infrastructures (Muha, 2007, 9.). Considering its increasing importance in the 
information society, where the different critical infrastructures are closely in-
terlinked with one another, (Haig, 2009, 329-337.) critical infrastructure has 
always been an attractive target for malicious intent, springing both from state 
as well as from non-state actors, such as the Madrid (2004) and London (2005) 
attacks, further the assassinations on train and public transport, as well as the 
terrorist attack at the airport and central metro station in Brussels (2016). The 
precise definition of critical infrastructure is complicated by the dense con-
nections, networks, nodes and interactions involved as well as by the fact that 
the parameters by which a particular infrastructure is classified as critical may 
change over time. 1
The European Commission defines critical infrastructure as a tool or system 
that is vital to maintaining basic social functions. (URL1) Critical infrastructure 
encompasses communications, emergency services, energy, dams, finance, food, 
public services, industry, health, transportation, gas, public communications, 
radio and television, information technology, commercial equipment, chem-
ical and nuclear industries, water and forest management. (Besenyő, 2019) A 
broader definition of critical infrastructure includes banking and finance, tel-
ecommunications, emergency services, air, sea and rail transport, health care, 
the food industry and energy and water supply. Recent studies argue that the 
question of protecting critical infrastructure should not be seen as an isolated 
phenomenon and the question of solely independent-functioning systems, but 
rather as something integrating several aspects of security and vital functions 
of society. Attacks against such systems can inevitably lead to disruption of 
public services, which - in more serious cases - is accompanied by chaos on 
a social scale. Some components of critical infrastructure are predominantly 
interdependent and closely interrelated, e.g. food supply depends on transport, 
telecommunications on electricity, and healthcare can simultaneously depend 
on electricity, water, and emergency services. As more states become increas-
ingly dependent on critical infrastructure that is partially or totally outside the 
narrower public sphere (in the competitive sphere), it is of pivotal importance 
that public-private partnerships and constructive cooperation form an integral 
part of comprehensive defence and preventive strategies (Clemente, 2013). An 
important contribution to the debate on critical infrastructure protection and the 
research thereof was made by several Hungarian researchers as part of a larger 
1   United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED). Physi-
cal protection of Critical Infrastructure Against Terrorist Attacks, CTED Trends Report, 2017.03.08.
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project thoroughly and comprehensively investigating the methods for such 
protection (Nádai, 2016).
In order to investigate the broader meaning of the term critical infrastructure, 
the paper makes an attempt to argue why certain categories of human resources 
may be considered within this definition. This paper argues that in the context 
of jihadist-inspired terrorist attacks against members of law enforcement agen-
cies as well as military personnel, these targets should be considered within the 
broader definition of critical infrastructure, as it is the members of these organ-
isations that are ultimately responsible for the well-functioning of the agencies 
tasked with providing order and security for the citizens. Including the human 
resources in the definition of critical infrastructure may contribute to these agen-
cies receiving protection to a larger extent through more comprehensive pre-
ventative strategies in the context of counterterrorism and counter-extremism.
The ideology behind the attacks on critical infrastructure 
Analysis of a large sample of CI attack data (through the Critical Infrastructure 
Terrorist Incident Catalog – CrITC – created by researchers at the Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory) shows that groups generally classified as reli-
giously motivated have accounted for roughly 73% of all casualties and 35% of 
all fatalities claimed by attacks against critical infrastructure worldwide that took 
place in the second half of the 20th century and in the years following the millen-
nium until 2003. The vast majority of the organisations involved fall into the Is-
lamic subcategory. As Ackerman et. al. has underlined, ʻ these statistics support 
a frightening hypothesis – that religious terrorist groups are more likely than 
other groups to mix CI attacks with mass casualty attacks.’ (Ackerman, 2007).
a. The trope of total war
With regards to Jihadi Salafism, following the invasion of Afghanistan and that 
of Iraq, jihadist ideologists declared Europe to be a territory of war and called 
for attacks on the continent. Collective retaliation, i.e. aggression against civil-
ians got justified once members of a community carry out acts against Muslims 
with the approval and consent of the others. The dogma got applied in the attacks 
against Western democracies, claiming that citizens elect their leaders and there-
fore bear responsibility for their acts. One of the most detailed elaborations of this 
approach is laid down in the text justifying the 2005 London attacks: ʻ Any Briton 
who voted for war is a combatant, or at least sides with the enemy’. (March, 2009)
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The apocalyptic revanchist (Sandal, 2018) dogma that justified the attacks 
against civilians was elaborated in a series of manuals and propaganda mate-
rials. In the ideology of the Islamic State (in the following: ISIS) apocalypse 
is of crucial importance: it has either already started or just about to take place. 
Every single combat or attack is a prat of or a prelude to the final battle be-
tween the righteous and the false.  A tradition that envisions Dabiq in the north 
of Syria as the location of this final battle was very emphatic in the discourse 
of ISIS, (URL2) and this is why their primary propaganda magazine was enti-
tled Dabiq (Wood, 2015).
The al-Qā‛ida propaganda asserting that Europe is carrying out a crusade 
against Islam, is reiterated by the ideologues of ISIS as well. Among their argu-
ments not only the participation in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan was listed, 
but also grievances of Muslims living in Europe such as the ban on the hijab 
or the cartoons ridiculing Muhammad. In February 2004, Ayman al-Zawahiri 
classified banning the hijab from French schools as equivalent to burning down 
villages in Afghanistan, destroying Palestinian homes, murdering children or 
the looting Iraq. (Nesser, 2000).
Given that the notion of critical infrastructure includes public communications, 
radio and television, the attacks on the headquarters of the French satirical mag-
azine Charlie Hebdo on 7 January 2015 may be considered as such, as well as 
being a strong indicator of the global aspirations of ISIS and a turning point in its 
media campaign. Hitting a symbolic outlet of secular press freedom in the heart 
of Europe was a high profile, effective and economical manoeuvre, the first in a 
chain of terrorist attacks that shook Europe between 2015 and 2019. Bernat Aragó 
proved to be right in assuming that the goal instead of urging radical Muslims to 
enrol in the army in their caliphate was rather ʻ to encourage the receiver living in 
the West to move to action without the need to travel to the Middle East.’ (Aragó, 
2015) In the 4th issue, quoting Abu Muhammad al-‛Adnānī al-Shāmī, the spokes-
man of the organisation back then, the logic or revanchism appears at its clearest:
ʻO Americans, and O Europeans … It is you who started the transgression 
against us, and thus you deserve blame and you will pay a great price. You will 
pay the price when your economies collapse. You will pay the price when your 
sons are sent to wage war against us, and they return to you as disabled ampu-
tees, or inside coffins, or mentally ill. You will pay the price as you are afraid 
of travelling to any land. Rather you will pay the price as you walk on your 
streets, turning right and left, fearing the Muslims. You will not feel secure even 
in your bedrooms. You will pay the price when this crusade of yours collapses, 
and thereafter we will strike you in your homeland, and you will never be able 
to harm anyone afterwards.’ (URL3)
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Al-‛Adnānī’s call to murder crusaders, whether they are dressed in uniform 
or as civilians, by all possible means, made any target legitimate, blurring all 
kinds of boundaries between law enforcement and military infrastructure, pol-
iticians and common citizens. From this moment on, the declared goal was the 
destruction of western lifestyle in its entirety. Attacks on critical infrastructure, 
on their manpower in specific are highlighted, however the definition of criti-
cal infrastructure is broad and inclusive:
ʻStrike their police, security, and intelligence members, as well as their treach-
erous agents. Destroy their beds. Embitter their lives for them and busy them 
with themselves...Do not ask for anyone’s advice and do not seek anyone’s ver-
dict. Kill the disbeliever whether he is civilian or military, for they have the 
same ruling.’ (URL3)
As the examples show, jihadist propaganda employs figurative language. Every 
civilian is referred to as a representative of the hostile system through the use of 
synecdoche - any part of the described object refers to its whole and vice ver-
sa – and metonymy – designating the object by only one of its qualities – such 
as describing the West as crusader and imperialist, and transferring this quality 
to the individual citizen defined as a inimical soldier, agent etc. This linguistic 
tool helps defacing the victims and dispelling any moral doubt regarding the 
carnage of innocent civilians. The idea magazine is further elaborated in the 
Rumiyah by explicitly calling for attacks on citizens, claiming that ʻthe blood 
of the disbelievers is halal, …This includes the businessman riding to work in 
a taxicab, the young adults (post-pubescent children) engaged in sports ac-
tivities in the park, and the old man waiting in line to buy a sandwich. Indeed, 
even the blood of the kafir street vendor selling flowers to those passing by is 
halal to shed – and striking terror into the hearts of all disbelievers is a Mus-
lim’s duty. There is no shar‛i requirement to target soldiers and policemen nor 
judges and politicians, but all kuffar who are not under the covenant of dhim-
mah are fair game.’ (URL4)
In this line of argument, each human or material constituent represents the 
whole inimical system. Through a semantic shift, civilians are defined as crusad-
ers, and the ordinary infrastructure of daily life as symbols, embodiments, and 
requisites of the western secular order. There is no small or insignificant target, 
the all-inclusive understanding and the frequency of the attacks pose constant 
threat, thus exhaust the enemy and empower the attacker. In the reframing of 
ISIS, no target is forbidden to hit, and there is no attack of small significance. 
The Rumiyah – magazine took over where al-Qā‛ida’s Inspire had left off that 
is encouraging ʻOpen Source Jihad’ renamed as just terror operations by the 
use of common, available means such as vehicles and knives (URL5).
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b. Theoretical foundations
The strategy was elaborated in various manuals and books, the most well-known 
of them are Questions from the Jurisprudence of Jihad also known as Fiqh al-Da-
ma’ (Jurisprudence of Blood) a volume compiled from lectures given by Abu 
Abdallah al-Muhajir in the 1990s in Afghanistan, (URL6) and The Management 
of Savagery written under the pseudonym Abu Bakr Nājī, that has been circu-
lating on the Internet since 2004. Al-Muhajir is considered as the principal ar-
chitect of Islamic legal justification supporting terrorist attacks and all-out war. 
He was an Egyptian national who graduated from the Islamic University in Is-
lamabad fought in Afghanistan where he also worked as an instructor in jihadi 
camps. From 2012 he stayed in Syria where he allegedly died in 2016. In defin-
ing forms of killing al-Muhājir drew parallels between the traditional and the 
modern means and approved the use of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear 
and chemical weapons. Concerning critical infrastructure, he agreed to burn-
ing or flooding crops, cutting trees and plants, and destroying all kinds of land, 
property, facilities, all that can strengthen the enemy. Similarly he encouraged 
targeting children, women, the elderly and monks asserting that Islam does not 
differentiate between military and civilians. As such, killing an infidel is always 
justified as punishment of infidelity. He argued for kidnapping, beheading and 
suicide operations. Following the structure of standard fiqh literature he supports 
his views by referring to Quranic passages (for example 59: 2, 59: 5, 2 22: 39, 3 
9: 14-15 4) and various traditions which affirm that Muhammad also destroyed 
his enemies’ fruit trees that were an essential source of food sustenance and of 
protection from the desert sun. (Peters, 1977). In the referred texts, God is an 
active participant in the battles, therefore fighting is no longer just a doubtful 
political tool, but becomes a religious obligation. Based on the quotes, al-Mu-
hajir reiterates that one cannot be a good Muslim unless he fights for the cause 
of God. Reaching out to the enemy in their safe zones, depriving them of their 
livelihood and the basic infrastructure that guarantees their survival was meant 
to be a proportionate punishment for their disbelief.
The Management of Savagery is a Salafi jihadist manual on how to wage jihad 
in a non-declared war. It outlines a strategic road map of how to create chaos 
2   Qur’an 59: 5 ʻWhatever you have cut down of [their] palm trees or left standing on their trunks - it was 
by permission of Allah and so He would disgrace the defiantly disobedient.’ (URL7)
3   Qur’an 22: 39 ʻPermission [to fight] has been given to those who are being fought, because they were 
wronged. And indeed, Allah is competent to give them victory.’ (URL8)
4   Qur’an 9: 14-15 ʻFight them, and Allah will punish them by your hands, cover them with shame, help 
you (to victory) over them, heal the breasts of Believers, And still the indignation of their hearts. For 
Allah will turn (in mercy) to whom He will; and Allah is All-Knowing, All-Wise’ (URL9)
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and fear among the enemies of Islam and grasp power from inside in any giv-
en society. The book describes the process in three stages the first of which is 
called marḥalat al-nikāya wa-l-inhāk (the power of vexation and exhaustion) 
carried out by groups and separate cells until the anticipated chaos and savage-
ry breaks out. The objectives of this phase are the following:
ʻ1 – Exhausting the forces of the enemy and the regimes collaborating with 
them, dispersing their efforts, and working to make them unable to catch their 
breath by means of operations in the regions of the choice states, primary or 
otherwise, even if the operations are small in size or effect. Although the blow 
of the rod may only strike a (single) Crusader head, its spread and escalation 
will have an effect for a long period of time.
2 – Attracting new youth to the jihadi work by undertaking qualitative opera-
tions [‛amaliyyat naw‛iyya] – when it is appropriate with respect to timing and 
ability – that will grab peoples’ attention...Also note: The normal, small oper-
ation and its results must be considered very valuable...
3 – Dislodging the chosen regions – regions in which it was decided to have 
focused movement, whether in all of the priority regions or in some of them – 
from the control of the regimes and then working toward the administration of 
savagery which will transpire in it.
4 – The advancement of groups of vexation through drilling and operational 
practice so that they will be prepared psychologically and practically for the 
stage of the management of savagery.’ (Nājī, 2004)
The strategy described above is that of an asymmetric, guerrilla warfare. During 
this period, the primary goal is to dismantle the central power of the enemy and 
create favourable conditions for an all-out jihad. At the beginning of the pro-
cess, when central power is still strong, the fight has to be carried out in smaller 
groups or cells. In this phase, vital economic and strategic targets are attacked, 
comprising oil facilities, economic infrastructure, tourism and foreigners as 
well as entertainment spots. This drains out the security forces and plunges the 
society into savagery and chaos which provides the jihadists an opportunity for 
launching a comprehensive offensive. As the author explains:
ʻIf an oil interest is hit near the port of Aden, there will have to be intensive 
security measures put in place for all of the oil companies, and their tankers, 
and the oil pipelines in order to protect them and draining will increase. If 
two of the apostate authors are killed in a simultaneous operation in two dif-
ferent countries, they will have to secure thousands of writers in other Islam-
ic countries. In this way, there is a diversification and widening of the circle 
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of targets and vexation strikes which are accomplished by small, separate 
groups.’ (Nājī, 2004)
This tactic is meant to spread hopelessness in the hearts of the enemy, and makes 
them pay the price  Moreover, it is not necessary that the retaliation is directed 
against the perpetrators, rather acts of deterrence in any part of the world is fit 
for purpose making the enemy feel that he is surrounded. Violence is therefore 
not only a means of physical warfare, but a strategic tool aimed at the psychic 
impact on both the victim and the perpetrators. The first issue of Dabiq deals 
in detail with the benefits of violence, defining its primary purpose, in the spir-
it of Nājī’s book, is to provoke chaos. The manuals and texts call for the great-
est possible destruction by legitimising any target, encouraging killing at any 
time in any place referring to cases of early Islamic history when aggression 
guaranteed expansion. 
c. Aims and tactics
The strategic thinking is well reflected in the propaganda, and in certain instanc-
es the text is emphatic about the economic gains of the operation. This is well 
exemplified in the following:
ʻAttack the interests of the Crusader coalition near you, including their embas-
sies, businesses, and ʻ civilians. Burn down their government institutions just as 
they try to bomb our buildings where Allah’s law is upheld’ (URL10)
The justification is backed by the monopoly of truth, based on the alliance 
with God. The corrupt West and all its inhabitants deserve material loss, while 
the spoils of war wait for the faithful. Besides the Qur’ānic references that call 
to retaliation, 5 claiming that violence must be met with counter-violence as the 
only means for restraining the powerful, Muhammad’s practice -itself a source 
of Islamic jurisprudence – reveals a conscious tactic of destroying the economic 
structure of the Meccan society led by the Quraysh, through attacking their car-
avans before the actual conquest of the city took place. As Patricia Crone high-
lighted in her study of Meccan trade in the early sources of Islam, among them 
works by early Muslim historians and hagiographers, Ibn Ishāq and al-Wāqidī:
ʻit could be argued that the traditional account of how Muhammad forced 
Mecca to surrender should be rejected. For one thing, the number of caravans 
5   Qur’an 6:126: ʻAnd if you punish, you are to punish with the like of what you were punished.’ 2:19 
ʻWhoever commits aggression against you, retaliate against him in the same measure as he committed 
against you’ 4:78 ʻWherever you are, death will find you out. Even if you are in towers built up strong 
and high.’ (URL11)
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threatened or intercepted by Muhammad is considerably larger in Wāqidi ̄than 
in Ibn Ishāq: the three caravans that are plundered by the Muslims over a period 
of five or six years in the latter’s work scarcely suffice to explain why a trading 
city of major importance let alone one backed by a ‘Meccan Commonwealth’ 
should have surrendered to a nest of robbers.’ (Crone, 2004)
We can assume therefore that smiting the trade roots surrounding Mecca, raid-
ing the caravans and posing a constant threat on the Meccan society prepared 
the way for its relatively easy invasion. In the contemporary Jihadi-Salafi man-
uals, hitting economic targets is recommended as it brings about exhaustion 
and social disruption. The Management of Savagery summarises the expected 
benefits as follows:
Prophetic tradition defines jihad as follows: ʻI asked the Prophet: What is ji-
had? And he said it is fighting against the unbelievers whenever you meet them’ 
(Ism. b. Isḥ, 1998) From this tradition, jurists have inferred the following nor-
mative definition for jihad: ʻFight with a sword against the unbelievers until 
they convert to Islam or pay tribute to the expression of humility in the form of 
taxes.’ (M. b. A. Ibn Rushd, 1998) In the 7th century, jihad targeted pagan Arab 
tribes, and was later extended to Jews and Christians living on the Arabian Pen-
insula and its neighbouring territories. This was not just a religious war, it was 
equally about goods and territories. In its contemporary version, the envisioned 
effect is the exposed vulnerability of the states that shakes the trust of the citi-
zens and their support of the government. This initiates a vicious circle, urging 
those in power to dedicate more efforts to maintaining law and order, an en-
deavour doomed to failure. This pressure burdens their economy, reduces their 
sources of income and creates an atmosphere of constant vigilance and general 
distrust. The planning process depends on many factors, among them the ide-
ology in the name of which they act, the message and the specific operational 
objective of the attack, and last but not least the available means to carry it out 
as well as the accessibility and vulnerability of the target. The strategy outlined 
in The Management of Savagery suggests first attacking the periphery and with 
time, moving towards the centre, defining them as easier and more accessible 
ʻthe peripheries and the crowded, popular regions are devoid of military forces 
or there are a number of troops in them with brittle leadership and weak power, 
without a sufficient number of officers.’ 
Similarly, there is no small target if it makes part of a strategy:
The text raises attention to the possibility of paralysing a system by eliminating 
its weakest constituents. With due understanding of the fact that the top of the 
hierarchy cannot function without its rank and file, it reiterates the slogan that 
every hit gains its significance with respect to the damage it causes to the entire 
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structure. The from the periphery to the centre strategy leads us to another highly 
contested issue, that of Jihadist infiltration into the armed forces. The Manage-
ment of Savagery explicitly recommends this tactic in the following passage:
ʻ(We) should infiltrate the police forces, the armies, the different political par-
ties, the newspapers, the Islamic groups, the petroleum companies (as an em-
ployee or as an engineer), private security companies, sensitive civil institu-
tions, etc. That actually began several decades ago, but we need to increase 
it in light of recent developments. Likewise, we may need to infiltrate a single 
place with more than one member—one member will not know another (mem-
ber) and vice versa—for different roles or the same role if it requires more than 
one member.’ (Nājī, 2004)
This line of thought summaries a conscious, gradual, three-pronged bottom 
– up approach: selecting and gaining access to crucial organisations and insti-
tutions, joining them and increasing the presence of agents, building up a re-
serve of them while maintaining their isolation and the security of the network.
Modus operandi - jihadist-inspired attacks 
on critical infrastructure in the west
a. Psychological operations in asymmetric warfare
In examining the relationship between critical infrastructure and jihadist at-
tacks, it is a foregone conclusion that, in its genre, terrorism uses elements of 
military, economic as well as psychological warfare against the target coun-
try and its economy. In the field of psychological warfare, the aim is to spread 
fear, anxiety and panic throughout society (regardless of geographical loca-
tion), making citizens feel unsafe everywhere. Therefore, the failure of a gov-
ernment to prevent and counter terrorist attacks that potentially target multi-
ple segments of society - be it a critical infrastructure, a business, a restaurant, 
a mall, a hotel, a transport arena or a venue for public and social uprisings - 
conveys the message that the state is unable to guarantee the security of its 
citizens and protect its critical infrastructures against the damage caused by 
terrorists. With regards to the types and the methods of attack, against critical 
infrastructure between 1993 and 2003, oil/gas, power, and public service/Gov-
ernment Office infrastructure facilities top the list. These targets also account-
ed for the largest number of casualties.  Minor attacks against embassies and 
consulates accounted for almost 50% of the total. Bombing has been the most 
favoured method. As Ackerman et. al. indicated,  ʻterrorists generally attack 
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infrastructure because: 1) they want to destroy certain important facilities;  2) 
they feel that they  can obtain more publicity or external support than if they 
had attacked non‐infrastructural  targets; 3) they can cause even larger num-
ber of casualties – or avoid causing casualties  altogether – by attacking such 
facilities; 4) the symbolic value of infrastructural targets is greater  than that 
of other targets; or 5) for a complex combination of general and very specific 
reasons.’ (Ackerman, 2007) Between 2004 and 2018 there were 107 Islamist 
terrorist attacks in Europe killing 622 individuals. In eight cases terrorists tar-
geted public transport vehicles (train, metro) or stations. By November 2019, 
twelve attacks took place against police stations or personnel. On 3 October 
2019, a police employee at the Paris police headquarters stabbed four of his 
colleagues to death and injured two others. It should be noted, however, that 
more than 80 percent of Western states’ critical infrastructure is owned and 
operated by the private sector, and it has become evident that security in this 
area is not solely the state’s responsibility but also depends to a large extent 
on the quality of public-private partnerships.
b. Attacks on transport systems, vehicles, stations and operators
Jihadist-inspired attackers have in recent years repeatedly demonstrated their 
ability and readiness to plan and execute attacks on any critical infrastructure 
in Europe. Examples include the bombing of the aforementioned Madrid train 
station in 2004 (10 bombs on four commuter trains at three stations in Madrid 
killed 193 people and wounded more than 1,800) and the coordinated suicide 
bombings on London public transport in 2005, both of which were carried out 
by al-Qā‛ida followers. Already in 2015, several previous incidents pointed 
at the similar intent of the Islamic State, a terrorist organization carrying al- 
Qā‛ida’s ideology calling for global jihad, according to Europol. (URL12) In 
June 2015, a man drove to the site of an American gas industrial company near 
Lyon called Air Products & Chemicals, where he wanted to blow up gas tanks 
(URL13). The courier and delivery man – in whose possession the black flag 
of the Islamic State was found - tried to set fire to one of the gas and acetone 
storage buildings but could only cause a smaller explosion. Before the blasting 
attempt, the man beheaded his property boss. One month after the incident, a 
large-scale explosion at an oil plant in southern France highlighted the vulnera-
bility of similar sites and critical infrastructures. In both cases, the perpetrators 
had relatively easy access to the facilities and were able to trigger explosions 
using flammable chemicals, causing significant damage to the facilities. The 
selection of facilities, according to Europol, demonstrates that chemical plants 
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(and critical infrastructure as such) can play a key role in the future of target-
ing terrorist groups.
On March 22, 2016, two men who had pledged allegiance to the Islamic 
State carried out a simultaneous attack at Zaventem International Airport in 
the Belgian capital and at Maelbeek Metro Station near the city centre (Sinai, 
2016). Nearly 30 people were killed and some 300 injured in the attacks. Such 
attacks on the capital’s transport infrastructure also give rise to a sense of fear, 
uncertainty and vulnerability of the population, and a diminished confidence 
in the government’s defence capabilities, as they will be targeted at the same 
time by future attacks on transport. It is no coincidence that the airport was 
blown up on a departure site with a lower level of security control, which has 
reaffirmed the terrorists’ conscious strategy to identify and exploit vulnerable 
areas of the target.
In the United Kingdom, ʻon September 15, 2017, an 18-year old Iraqi asy-
lum seeker named Ahmed Hassan detonated a bomb using triacetone triperox-
ide on a District line train at Parsons Green Underground station in London. 
Thirty people were treated for burn and other injuries.’ (URL14) As for attacks 
against entertainment facilities, in 13 November 2015 the Bataclan Theatre in 
Paris Saint Denis was targeted simultaneously with Stade de France where a 
football match was taking place and various other entertainment facilities, with 
a death toll of 130. On May 22, 2017, Salman Abedi detonated an improvised 
explosive device in the Manchester Arena demanding the life of 22.
Some recent trends seem to imply that terrorist organisations such as al-Qā‛ida 
in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the Islamic State (ISIS) rather propagate 
for the jihadi carrying out the attack to stay alive in order to be able to contin-
ue with further ones. An example of such an attack would be the derailment of 
trains, such as suggested in a 2017 issue of Inspire, the propaganda magazine 
of al-Qā‛ida in the Arabian Peninsula, dedicating an entire edition to step-by-
step describe how to derail trains in Europe and US for future terrorist attacks. 
The 18 pages article described in detail how to make a derailment tool with 
cardboard, an empty plastic container, part of a rubber tyre, pipes, iron wires, 
screws, sheet metal, and cement. The operation does not require any electron-
ic or construction tools, so potential jihadis can easily ʻremove any traces for 
suspicion.’ In the view of AQAP, railways make a perfect target, as they can-
not be fully protected. 
ʻAmerica’s railroads are estimated to be a 1/3 of the world’s railway. So how 
can they protect 240,000 km of railroad … it is practically impossible. The same 
goes to Britain, with 18,500 km and France, with 29,473 km. It is a daunting 
and almost impossible task to protect the long railroad length, and yet one of 
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the easiest to target. That may result to great damage and destruction on dif-
ferent levels,’ 
To this, al-Qā‛ida’s ʻLone Jihad Guidance Team’ adds: 
ʻit is time that we instil fear and make them impose strict security measures 
to trains as they did with their air transportation.’ We have to expose more 
of their vulnerabilities in their security. And when they spend millions of dol-
lars to tackle a vulnerability, we should be ready to open a new [front]…  we 
expect that there will be no effective solution to the security gaps that may 
be caused by these types of operations that target the train system.ʻThe men-
tioned three countries were singled out as they ’have shown open hostilities 
towards Muslims’.
As illustrated below, AQAP showed particular interest in the high-speed train 
Acela in the U.S. 
ʻThis is the most suited condition for a successful train derail operation. When 
a train reaches high speed then it has to be reduced to around 100 km/h. This is 
because a train at a very high speed is hard to control or manage using brakes. 
For example, America’s high-speed train ‘Acela’ requires a whole mile so that it 
can come to a halt, this is because of the train’s very high speed. Another reason 
is that the train losses weight and stability when it is at high speeds,’ the article 
stated. ʻ Therefore, a Mujahid must be aware of areas where the train increases 
its speed and places where the train moves at a high speed.’
Another scenario favoured by the authors was the one ʻ that makes the different 
security agencies sleepless’ — if a jihadist could wage a complex ʻdual oper-
ation’ attacking a train hauling hazardous materials through a well-populated 
area. ʻ Observing and surveilling the movements of these Hazmat trains’ would 
be pivotal, as well as tapping into open-source intelligence available from gov-
ernment agencies in the U.S.
Research on the security capacity of Subway, U-Bahn, Underground, MRT, 
Rapid Transit, Metrorail showed that technical systems employed presently in 
metros cannot prevent bringing certain type of explosive devices into the metro 
stations and carriages. (Shvetsov, 2017)An analysis reflecting on the Brussels 
attacks highlighted, that according to the Congressional Research Service five 
times as many people per day in the U.S. travel by subway than by plane which 
makes public transport an ideal target for terrorists. Moreover, the much-need-
ed high security – besides being extremely costly – would paralyse and destroy 
public surface transportation, while crowds of people waiting to get through a 
security back up at a crammed train station would create another target for ter-
rorists. (URL15)
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c. Attacks on members of law enforcement and armed forces
Jihadist-inspired attacks against members of law enforcement agencies and armed 
forces have increased in Europe. In October 2019 four police officers where 
knifed to death by their colleague at Paris police headquarters. What makes the 
incident especially alarming is that Mickaël Harpon, the perpetrator had access 
to classified police intelligence files. As The Economist summarised: ʻHe en-
joyed high-level security clearance, which was renewed in 2008 and 2013. His 
job gave him access to a mass of intelligence data, including personal contact 
details of police officers and of individuals under surveillance, some of which 
have subsequently been found on a USB key in his possession.’ (URL16)
This attack was not the only of its kind in France. Previous incidents include: 
ramming attack against soldiers stationed in Levallois-Perret in the north west-
ern suburbs of Paris (August 2017); crash into a police van outside Champs-
Elysées with a car containing a gas canister (June 2017); a man attacking a 
policeman on patrol outside the Notre Dame cathedral in Paris with a hammer 
and two knives shouting ʻ This is for Syria’ (June 2016); killing of a policeman 
and severely wounding of other two at Champs-Elysées (April 2017), murder 
of two policemen in the city of Magnanville west of Paris (June 2016) by a 
man who had sworn allegiance to ISIS; and the attack against police officers at 
the Tours police station by a Burundi-born convert to Islam (2014). These are 
merely examples; the list of attacks against members of law enforcement and 
military personnel in France contains many more incidents similar to the ones 
listed above. Similar examples of Islamist extremist attacking police and mili-
tary personnel are found in a wide range of countries including e.g. Afghanistan, 
Indonesia, Iraq, Bosnia- Herzegovina, Saudi Arabia and Kenya. 
The scale of the danger is well illustrated by the fact that Mickaël Harpon 
enjoyed high-level security clearance and his colleagues declined to submit 
written complaints against him, although noticed significant changes in his be-
haviour and sympathies. France has put in place a system designed to detect 
radicalised people, which was expanded in 2018. It comprises a list of warning 
signs, such as a change in dress or behaviour, which are supposed to trigger an 
alert. The findings are already alarming. ʻAccording to a parliamentary report 
in June, 12,809 people are on a watch list as a result. Such lists are used to help 
screen recruits to sensitive public services. In 2018, of the 10,840 queries con-
cerning applicants to the police force forwarded to the national security inquiry 
service, five were judged problematic. It also keeps watch on employees. There 
are currently around 30 cases concerning suspected radicalisation within the 
police force and gendarmerie.’ – reports The Economist.
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Several other countries are experiencing deadly violence against soldiers and po-
lice officers by Islamist extremists. Between December 2013 and May 2018, British 
intelligence and law enforcement agencies thwarted 25 plots from extreme Islamic 
groups, most of which were inspired rather than directed by the Islamic State and 
its ideology. In May 2013, British soldier Lee Rigby was murdered in Woolwich 
by two Islamist extremists of Nigerian origin. Combined attacks of driving into 
pedestrians and stabbing in central, governmental areas took place on March 22, 
2017, when the British-born Khalid Masood drove a sports utility vehicle into pe-
destrians crossing Westminster Bridge in London, killing three people, then stabbed 
a police officer outside of Parliament. In September 2014, an Afghan Islamist ex-
tremist stabbed two counter terrorism officers in Melbourne. In October the same 
year a lone perpetrator shot a soldier at a war memorial and attacked Parliament 
in Ottawa, Canada. The offender has converted to Islam many years prior to the 
assault. The same month another attack took place against four police officers in 
New York. The hatchet-wielding assailant was identified as a former member of 
the U.S. Navy, who had been involuntarily discharged and who was also an advo-
cate for black power as well as a recent convert to Islam at the time of the attack.
Conclusion
Critical infrastructure represents a global sector of a market economy, also imply-
ing that due to this nature it cannot be fully protected at all times and everywhere. 
Unfortunately, as the examples so far show, successful terrorist attacks targeting 
critical infrastructure are likely to continue. As discussed earlier, a broader defi-
nition of critical infrastructure includes banking and finance, telecommunications, 
emergency services, air, sea and rail transport, health care, the food industry and 
energy and water supply, but also the maintenance of order and security in the 
society. Since the latter – like almost all of the previously mentioned – are oper-
ated by humans, the question of human resources as critical infrastructure arises. 
In the context of this study, examining jihadist-inspired attacks on critical infra-
structure, the authors have argued that members of law enforcement as well as 
armed forces to be considered within the scope of critical infrastructure. Jihadist 
sources are explicitly inclusive in their definition of critical infrastructure, which, 
besides their propaganda value prove a semantic shift, unilateral as it seems, still 
bears the potential to launch an overall attack against all dimensions of civil life 
in the West. The frequency of open source jihadist attacks – committed by blad-
ed weapons like knives and vehicles - has turned the menacing message into a 
strategy of decentralised, non-coordinated, largely spontaneous and therefore 
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largely unpredictable attacks. Operations targeting human resources tasked with 
the maintenance of public order and security (as well as national security) can 
inevitably lead to severe disruption of these services and might result in chaos on 
a social scale. Moreover, creating vigilant societies or resilient structures places 
an unreasonably heavy burden on the affected states and its psychological im-
pacts still have a long way to be estimated.
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